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ustralian governments of both political persuasions have been embroiled 
in controversies over military cooperation with Indonesia since bilateral 
defence relations first began to gather steam under the Keating Labor 
government in the early 1990s.  Prime Minister Paul Keating and Foreign Minister 
Gareth Evans were enthusiastic proponents of building strong ties with Indonesia, 
a policy which was extended to the military sphere with the establishment of two 
high level committees to coordinate and develop defence cooperation in 1994 
(Ball and Kerr, 1996:70).  These committees were later incorporated into an 
expanded defence agreement by the newly elected Howard Government in 1996, 
leading to the establishment of five working groups covering logistics, science and 
technology, communications, interoperability, education, training and exchanges 
(Walters, 1996:3).  
But engagement with the Indonesian Special Forces (Komando Pasukan 
Khusus — Kopassus) has been especially contentious because of the well 
documented involvement of this elite Army unit in human rights abuses and some 
of the more egregious excesses of the Soeharto regime.  It was a special forces 
unit under the command of Captain Yunus Yosfiah (later a minister in the Habibie 
government) that murdered five Western journalists at Balibo, East Timor in 
November 1975 (Ball and McDonald, 2000:100-13), while dozens of Islamic 
activists were killed in an ostensible government crack down on criminals at 
Tanjung Priok, a decade later (Schwarz, 1994:181; Vatikiotis, 1993:128); and 
Pathoni, 2002:13).  Special forces ‘black ninja’ have also regularly terrorised rural 
communities throughout the archipelago for political and pecuniary reasons in a 
perversion of their national security role. 
Concerns about the utility and morality of developing links with Kopassus 
were temporarily put to rest when bilateral defence cooperation was suspended in 
the wake of Indonesia’s ignominious withdrawal from East Timor in 1999.  But 
the Bali bombing in October, 2002 and the heightened security focus on terrorism 
in Australia have stimulated calls for a resumption of ties with Kopassus as the 
principal agency in Indonesia vested with responsibility for counter terrorism.  For 
example, Defence Minister Robert Hill cautiously endorsed renewed ties, subject 
to the significant qualification that Australia would only deal with Kopassus’s 
counter terrorist unit (Martin, 2002:5).  Opponents have rejected the idea, 
however, primarily on human rights grounds, but also because Kopassus is 
believed to have given aid and succour to the very terrorist groups it is supposed to 
be fighting.  In December 2002, for example, Shadow Minister for Foreign 
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Affairs, Kevin Rudd, claimed that there were ‘clear links between Kopassus and 
the Islamic terrorist organisation, Laskar Jihad’ (Office of the Shadow Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, 2002). 
What is Kopassus? 
Given the extent to which terrorist groups have entrenched themselves in the 
archipelago, cooperation with Kopassus clearly has the potential to become a 
vexatious issue for the Howard government, with important ramifications for 
national security policy, counter-terrorism and relations with Indonesia.  For these 
reasons it warrants a more considered assessment than the cursory and emotionally 
charged exchanges that have characterised much of the public debate so far. 
An essential first step is to dispel several misperceptions about the role and 
modus operandi of the elite 5,000 strong Special Forces, and to understand where 
the organisation fits in the overall structure of Indonesia’s Armed Forces (TNI).  
Kopassus is typically cast as a shadowy force that often operates outside the 
military chain of command and specialises in dirty tricks, covert intelligence 
gathering, and activities that could be loosely described as regime maintenance.  
Since President Soeharto’s demise, Kopassus has also been accused of banditry, 
warlordism and a multitude of nefarious criminal practices ranging from illicit 
timber felling to sabotage, contract killings and drug running (see, for example, 
Kingsbury, 2002:71).  Some of these accusations are undoubtedly true, but it 
would be a mistake to think of Kopassus only, or even primarily, in these terms. 
The Special Forces is also the best trained, resourced and disciplined unit in 
the armed forces, and its officers have traditionally been among the most able, as 
evidenced by the disproportionately high number who have risen to senior 
command.  Two notable examples are Generals Edi Sudradjat and Feisal Tanjung, 
both of whom later became armed forces commanders and, in Sudradjat’s case, 
Minister for Defence.  The current Army Chief, General Ryamizard Ryacudu, is a 
former Kopassus commander, as are two current cabinet ministers:  head of the 
National Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN), Lieutenant General 
(ret) A. M. Hendropriyono, and Transport Minister, Lieutenant General (ret) 
Agum Gumelar.  In recent years, however, the ratio has fallen, largely because the 
unit’s image has been tarnished within TNI itself.   
At one time Kopassus was the unit of choice for aspiring young officers, and 
its esprit de corps is still second to none within TNI (Haseman, 2002:34).  Like 
Australia’s Special Air Service (SAS) regiment, Kopassus is responsible for 
intelligence collection, small unit operations and training other elements of the 
armed forces in specialised military and intelligence skills.  The Special Forces are 
configured for rapid deployment to trouble spots anywhere within the archipelago, 
as well as overseas.  Kopassus also has a counter insurgency and counter terrorist 
role that is typical of special forces throughout the region (see Lowry, 1996:86-89 
on the structure and role of Kopassus).  Counter Terror Unit 81 (Satuan Gulangan 
81 – SG 81), named in part after a successful 1981 operation against the hijackers 
of a Garuda Airlines flight in Bangkok, is organic to Kopassus.  Headquartered in 
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Jakarta, SG 81 has played a significant role in locating and apprehending the 
terrorists responsible for the Bali bombing (Haseman, 2002:35). 
Unfortunately, these legitimate functions have been distorted and corrupted 
by venal politicians and ambitious career officers who have manipulated the unit 
for personal gain by exploiting the intense personal loyalties that bond the Special 
Forces brotherhood.  The politicisation of Kopassus reached its nadir in the mid-
1990s under Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, former president Soeharto’s 
son in law, who used the organisation as a de facto praetorian guard.  In this 
respect, Kopassus is a microcosm of TNI.  Unsurprisingly, there is a strong view 
among Indonesia’s ruling elite and growing middle class that Kopassus ought to 
be depoliticised and made more accountable to civilian control.  But it is difficult 
to see how this worthy objective can be achieved as long as TNI obtains more than 
half its budget from running private businesses, a bifurcation which encourages a 
culture of guns for hire.  While not atypical for a developing country, the business 
interests of the Indonesian military are extensive and embedded (for an analysis of 
TNI funding and structural weaknesses see Dupont, 1996:284-86).  Some of the 
money comes from military foundations and holding companies in which TNI has 
a stake, such as banks, hotels and real estate (McBeth, 2002:201).  More worrying 
is the increasing involvement of Kopassus personnel in brigandry, extortion, 
illegal logging and protection rackets. 
After a brave but ill-directed attempt by former president Abdurrachman 
Wahid to remove TNI from politics and make the armed forces more transparent 
and accountable, military reform seems to be off the government’s agenda.  In 
recent years, TNI has begun to reassert itself as traditional patronage and money 
politics has reemerged with a vengeance.  The weak and factionalised government 
of Megawati Sukarnoputri has become heavily reliant on TNI support, and is 
likely to remain so as the 2004 elections approach.  Decentralisation of political 
and economic power has reduced Jakarta’s control over the activities of the 
military in general, and Kopassus in particular, so that it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to determine whether Kopassus transgressions are the result of local 
initiatives or national policy.  Furthermore, it is not always clear to what extent 
senior TNI commanders are in the command loop.  The armed forces’ sullied 
reputation makes it an easy and obvious scapegoat for virtually any unexplained 
incident that smacks of clandestine or organised illegal activity.  But the reality is 
more complex and ambiguous than critics of the military sometimes allow. 
The assassination of Papuan independence leader, Theys Eluay, in November 
2001 is a case in point.  Although there is strong circumstancial evidence that 
Eluay was killed by special forces personnel, the motive for his killing and the 
culpability of senior TNI and Kopassus officers is unclear.  So is the extent of 
military support for terrorist groups.  Much has been made of Kopassus links with 
the notorious Laskar Jihad, which fomented and aggravated the inter-communal 
violence that devastated Maluku and parts of Sulawesi.  Most of the military 
training and support, however, seems to have been provided by a small group of 
TNI officers, with pro-Islamic leanings, not all of whom have Kopassus 
backgrounds or associations.  The senior officer most often associated with Laskar 
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Jihad is Lieutenant General Djadja Suparman, a former commander of the Army 
Strategic Reserve (Kostrad).  Sceptics may argue that this is moral hair splitting.  
But there is an important difference between institutional support for a nationally 
agreed policy and freelance operations conducted by former and serving military 
personnel for ideological and political reasons or personal gain. 
Australia will find it difficult to pick and choose its Indonesian partners 
according to some arbitrarily determined moral standard.  Moral foreign policies 
are fine in principle, but fraught with practical difficulties.  Aside from the 
obvious and unanswerable question of whose moral standards should apply, 
Jakarta is unlikely to accept a sectoral approach to defence relations whereby 
Kopassus is quarantined or kept at arm’s length (Munro, 2002).  Any attempt by 
Canberra to pursue such a policy would inevitably raise questions about the 
sustainability of the bilateral relationship, and reinforce perceptions in some 
quarters of the region that the Howard government is arrogant, patronising and 
lacking in understanding of political realities in Indonesia.  Moreover, while 
bilateral police cooperation post-Bali has exceeded expectations, Kopassus is still 
Indonesia’s pre-eminent counter-terrorist organisation, and will naturally expect to 
be involved in any collaborative arrangements to deal with future terrorist 
incidents.  Those who argue that Australia’s counter-terrorist cooperation should 
be confined to the Indonesian police ignore this reality and evince a well meaning, 
but ill conceived, moral relativism.  The police are hardly paragons of virtue, just 
as Kopassus is not the personification of all evil.  Both are products of the same 
security establishment, and mirror the strengths and weaknesses of the Indonesian 
state. 
Obstacles to Cooperation 
Nevertheless, the critics of engagement have a case.  No Australian government, 
whatever its complexion, can ignore Kopassus’s past abuses or its poor 
professional image — as both the Coalition and Labor have found to their cost.  
Indonesian liberals are also distrustful of Kopassus and see it as the epitome of all 
that is wrong with the armed forces.  The problem for the Howard government is 
that most of the Australian media and public will oppose comprehensive 
engagement with Kopassus unless there is convincing evidence that the 
organisation is seriously committed to reform. 
Laskar Jihad’s purported disbandment, announced with great fanfare in 
October, and progress on bringing to an end long-running strife in Aceh, Sulawesi 
and Maluku, will reduce the opportunities for mischief making by Kopassus for 
the time being at least.  But the hiatus may be short-lived, for there are no 
guarantees that any of the recently signed peace agreements will hold.  And there 
are worrying signs that the special forces leadership has switched its attention to 
the province of Papua, where pro-Indonesian militia activity is on the increase.  
Unlike East Timor, Indonesian conservatives and liberals are united in their view 
that Papua is an integral part of the nation and cannot be allowed to secede.  
Kopassus may therefore be given a free hand to repress internal dissent, along 
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with a licence to ‘protect’ Muslim settlers against perceived Christian 
provocations and to root out supporters of the independence movement.  An 
outbreak of sectarian violence in Papua in which Kopassus is complicit would 
seriously complicate the Howard government’s attempt to establish close working 
ties with the red berets. 
Although the spectre of future terrorist outrages provides opportunities for 
enhanced Australia-Indonesia security cooperation, there is a risk that TNI could 
manipulate the situation for political advantage and inadvertently inflame, rather 
than douse, the smouldering fires of Islamic fascism.  It is clear that the generals 
are awake to the possibilities that the war against terrorism provides for 
advancement of their own personal agendas as well as TNI’s institutional interests.  
The head of Indonesia’s National Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General (ret) 
A. M. Hendropriyono, a former Kopassus officer, has succeeded in having himself 
appointed as Indonesia’s counter-terrorist intelligence czar.  Another retired 
general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Coordinating Minister for Politics and 
Security, maintains responsible for policy. 
Of course it would be perverse to deny the military a prominent role in 
counter-terrorism, as it is one of only two organisations in Indonesia specifically 
equipped and resourced for the task.  (The other is the police, which is poorly 
resourced by comparison, and has only a limited capacity for strategic intelligence 
collection, forensic investigation and consequence management.)  However, the 
game is not just to kill terrorists.  They must be denied the political space to recruit 
new acolytes and spread their message of hate.  An over-reliance on military 
instruments to prosecute the war against terrorism could prove quite 
counterproductive, especially if Kopassus were left to its own devices.  As Paul 
Monk observes, far from stamping out radical Islamic thought in the late 1970s, 
the Shah of Iran’s secret police actually facilitated the anti-regime activities of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini by its ruthless repression of dissent.  SAVAK’s behaviour 
only served to reinforce the view among ordinary Iranians that the real enemy was 
not the Ayatollah but the security forces and their Western backers (Monk, 2002). 
Tailored Engagement 
This brief analysis provides some sense of the dilemma Canberra faces in its stated 
desire to work more closely with Indonesia at a time when Australia is 
demonstrably threatened by the spread of Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia.  
Australia is not alone in having to weigh its security concerns against its 
commitment to human rights.  Other democracies confront a similar quandary in 
deciding whether or not to engage Kopassus, given the organisation’s questionable 
human rights record and involvement in acts of terrorism and extra-judicial 
killings.  Nonetheless, engagement can be justified on three grounds.  First, in the 
new, more threatening strategic environment that Australia faces it is imperative 
that the opportunities for effective security cooperation with our regional 
neighbours are maximised.  Second, Kopassus is a highly capable, well-trained 
force that is an integral part of Indonesia’s counter-terrorist machinery, and it 
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would be counterproductive to exclude the special forces from bilateral initiatives 
to combat terrorism in Indonesia. 
Third, strong personal ties between the Australian Defence Forces and their 
TNI and Kopassus counterparts are not only crucial to an effective regional 
counter-terrorist strategy, but are also essential to the long term health of the 
Australia-Indonesia relationship.  The outstanding and unprecedented joint 
operation between the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) and the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) in successfully pursuing the perpetrators of the Bali bombing 
was due, in large part, to the personal rapport established over a number of years 
between senior AFP and POLRI officers (AFP Commissioner, Mick Keelty, and 
the head of the Indonesian police investigating team, I. Made Pastika, were both 
students together at the AFP’s 1993 Management of Serious Crime Course in 
Canberra).  That said, Australian engagement should not be unqualified.  We need 
to use what influence we have to encourage TNI to resume the stalled reform 
agenda and work towards the goal of a more accountable, professional and 
apolitical military force.  This should be done in conjunction with like-minded 
countries, but in a way that does not offend Indonesian sensibilities and recognises 
that the pace of reform is likely to be slow and uneven.  If Australia eschews 
security cooperation with TNI, our ability to shape its responses and resist the 
spread of Islamic fascism in Indonesia and the immediate neighbourhood will be 
greatly diminished. 
Of course the war against terrorism must be fought on a broad front.  Military 
action is not a substitute for an imaginative and broadly conceived strategy that 
addresses the poverty and social alienation that are root causes of terrorism.  
Nonetheless, preventive measures and consequence management (that is, handling 
terrorist acts once committed) are an intrinsic part of any effective counter terrorist 
strategy, both nationally and regionally.  By definition, the military must be 
involved as one of the key institutions vested with responsibility for counter-
terrorism.  This is especially so in developing states like Indonesia, where the 
armed forces dominate the security sector and are political actors as well.  
Quarantining or marginalising Kopassus is unachievable in practice, and would be 
ultimately self-defeating.  Such a policy would alienate not just Kopassus but the 
whole of TNI, and would have negative consequences for Australia-Indonesia 
relations — certainly while Megawati remains president. 
Police cooperation is a quintessential part of the security mosaic, and there is 
much more that Australia could do to assist the Indonesian police to build capacity 
in the crucial areas of forensic investigation, technical intelligence collection, and 
victim and bomb identification.  Indeed, police cooperation post-Bali has been 
exemplary, and is a model for other forms of collaborative activity with the 
Indonesian security establishment, including Kopassus.  But those who contend 
that our bilateral counter-terrorist cooperation should be confined to the police 
miss the point.  The police do not have the authority, expertise or resources to 
control all aspects of counter terrorism in Indonesia, nor should they.  Robbing 
Amirul to pay Dai would drive a wedge between TNI and the police, and would 
impede the development of trust and collegiality. 
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A more productive approach would be to pursue a policy of tailored 
engagement — entailing a multi-dimensional approach to security cooperation 
with Indonesia that includes, rather than isolates, Kopassus, and focuses on joint 
operations and intelligence gathering against Jemaah Islamiah and other 
fundamentalist groups.  Australia’s SAS could be authorised to resume training 
assistance to the counter terrorist arm of Kopassus, SG 81.  But a better option 
might be to encourage Indonesia to pursue the idea of creating a new joint 
counter-terrorist task force.  Ideally, this would bring together the police, SG 81 
and other elite military units such as the Air Force Special Forces Unit (Paskas) 
and special elements of the Marine Corps (Haseman, 2002:35). 
The virtue of this approach is that it would provide a more politically 
palatable, but still workable, framework for cooperation with Kopassus, which 
could be extended to other areas of the defence relationship over time.  In this way 
Australia could advance two important strategic objectives that until now have 
been seen as mutually incompatible — collaborating with Kopassus in support of 
our defence and national security interests, while continuing to encourage political 
and military reform as part of a broader agenda to entrench democracy and the 
rule of law in Indonesia.  Excluding Kopassus because of its human rights record 
provides no incentives for good behaviour.  A policy of tailored engagement, on 
the other hand, will create opportunities for leverage and influence that can only 
come through personal contact and sustained habits of dialogue.  The ball is in 
Australia’s court. 
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